

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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R 272105Z JUL 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 995

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3582

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: JULY 27 NAC: COUNCIL DISCUSSION OF US VIEWS ON MBFR

SECSTATE PLEASE PASS SECDEF

REF: STATE 146712

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD READ AND CIRCULATED TEXT OF "US VIEWS ON MBFR NEGOTIATING APPROACH" PER REFTEL IN COUNCIL MEETING ON JULY 27. INITIAL REACTION WAS POSITIVE. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS ASKED USEFUL QUESTIONS FOR CLARIFICATION WHICH WERE ANSWERED BY RUMSFELD AND DEAN. THERE WILL BE A FURTHER PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF THE US PAPER IN THE COUNCIL ON AUGUST 1 AND A FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THE BASIS OF INSTRUCTIONS ON AUGUST 3. FOLLOWING THAT, IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE PAPER WILL BE REFERRED TO THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE. END SUMMARY.

2. AFTER A SHORT RECESS TO PERMIT DELEGATIONS AN OPPORTUNITY TO READ THE US PAPER, NETHERLANDS CHARGE (BUWALDA) LED OFF THE QUESTION PERIOD BY COMMENTING THAT HE THOUGHT US HAD MADE A REAL EFFORT TO INTRODUCE ELEMENTS INTO THE NEW US PAPER WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN RAISED BY THE ALLIES. THE PAPER WAS TYPICALLY WELL CONSIDERED AND WELL THOUGHT OUT. HIS QUESTION REFERRED TO LANGUAGE IN PARA 12 C REFTEL WHICH STATES "THE FIRST PHASE SHOULD INCLUDE...". BUWALDA QUERIED WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT OTHER FORCES MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN THE FIRST PHASE OR WAS IT SIMPLY A SEMANTIC PROBLEM. RUMSFELD REPLIED THAT NO OTHER  
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FORCES WOULD BE INCLUDED.

3. BUWALDA INTRODUCED HIS SECOND QUESTION BY EXPRESSING SATISFACTION THAT THERE WOULD BE A PHASED APPROACH TO MBFR, BUT

COMMENTED THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASE WAS A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE TO WHICH HIS DELEGATION WOULD LATER RETURN. HIS PRELIMINARY QUESTION WAS WHEN SHOULD THE ALLIANCE, AT LEAST FOR INTERNAL PURPOSES, DEFINE THE SECOND PHASE OF MBFR. AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD REPLIED THAT THE US HAD MADE NO DECISIONS WHATEVER AS REGARDS THE COMPOSITION OF THE SECOND PHASE. THE SECOND PHASE IS A MEANS FOR DEALING WITH VARIOUS PROBLEMS WE MAY EXPECT TO ENCOUNTER. AMONG THESE ARE THE PROBABILITY THAT THE SOVIETS MAY RAISE THE QUESTION OF INDIGENOUS FORCES; THEY MIGHT ALSO RAISE OTHER QUESTIONS SUCH AS AIR FORCE MANPOWER OR AIR FORCES. ON THE NATO SIDE, SOME ALLIES MIGHT WISH TO BE IN A POSITION TO MEET POSSIBLE DOMESTIC PRESSURES FOR A REDUCTION OF EUROPEAN NATO FORCES IF THE FIRST PHASE IS A SUCCESS. SINCE IT MAY BE A CONVENIENCE FOR US ALL TO BE ABLE TO REFER TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A SECOND PHASE WITHOUT MAKING ANY COMMITMENTS WHATEVER REGARDING ITS CONTENT, RUMSFELD SAID THE US BELIEVED IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR THE ALLIES TO SPEND TIME NOW, BEFORE WE HAVE ANY IDEA OF THE REAL OUTCOME OF THE FIRST PHASE, IN TRYING TO FLESH OUT THE SECOND PHASE.

4. BUWALDA'S NEXT QUESTION REFERRED TO THE NEW DATA CONTAINED IN THE US PAPER. HE INQUIRED WHETHER THE US PROPOSAL FOR A PERCENTAGE REDUCTION WOULD NECESSITATE AGREEMENT ON A DATA BASE WITH THE WARSAW PACT. IF SO, THIS WOULD LEAD TO A VERY DIFFICULT DISCUSSION. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE NOTED THAT THERE WERE REFERENCES ALSO TO SOVIET DIVISIONS AND THAT THIS MIGHT BE A WAY TO MITIGATE THE DATA BASE PROBLEM. RUMSFELD INVITED DEAN TO COMMENT ON THIS; DEAN REPLIED, THAT THE US PROPOSAL WAS DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE DATA UNCERTAINTIES. IT DESCRIBED THE SOVIET REDUCTION IN TWO WAYS, AS A FORCE COMPONENT AND AS A PERCENTAGE OF SOVIET FORCES. THE TANK ARMY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED THE MORE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE. WE HAVE IN MIND ONE OF THE SOVIET TANK ARMIES IN EAST GERMANY, THE THIRD SHOCK ARMY TO THE NORTH, OR THE FIRST GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE SOUTH FACING THE ALLIES. WE WOULD PROPOSE TO ADVANCE OUR ESTIMATES TO THE SOVIETS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS AND INVITE THEM TO CHALLENGE THEM THROUGH HARD EVIDENCE OF THEIR OWN. IF THEY ARE ABLE TO DO SO WITH REGARD TO THE TANK ARMY AND CAN PROVE TO OUR FULL

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SATISFACTION THAT THERE ARE FEWER MEN IN IT THAN WE CLAIM, THEN WE WE COULD REDUCE OUR OWN US REDUCTIONS ACCORDINGLY.

5. DEAN WENT ON TO COMMENT THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH CLOSED SOCIETIES; EXACT DATA ON SOVIET FORCES WILL ALWAYS BE HARD TO OBTAIN, PARTICULARLY FOR MANPOWER. IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT OUR REVISED ESTIMATE OF SOVIET MANPOWER WAS NOT DERIVED FROM ANY RECENT SUDDEN CHANGE IN SOVIET FORCE POSTURE. RATHER, IT WAS BASED ON ASSESSMENT OF A NUMBER OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENTS, SOME OF WHICH BEGAN ABOUT THREE OR FOUR YEARS AGO. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN GRADUALLY IMPROVING THEIR CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES. THE EQUIPMENT CHANGES RESULTING FROM THE SOVIET FORCE IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO THE ALLIES EARLIER.

MANPOWER CHANGES ARE MUCH HARDER TO EVALUATE AND THIS PROCESS HAS TAKEN LONGER. A PART OF THE ESTIMATED MANPOWER INCREASE ARISES FROM RECENT IMPROVEMENTS IN OUR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT HAVE ENABLED US TO ASCERTAIN THAT CERTAIN UNITS IN EAST GERMANY ARE SEPARATE FROM AND ADDITIONAL TO THE ORGANIZED SOVIET DIVISIONS. THE REASON WHY THIS DATA IS EMERGING AT THIS POINT IS THAT THE US WISHED TO COMPLETE ITS ANALYSIS OF GRADUALLY ACCUMULATED DATA BEFORE REACHING A CONCLUSION ON ITS PREFERRED APPROACH. THE US IS CONTINUING ITS REASSESSMENT OF PACT FORCES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA. HE SAID THAT THE US ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN EAST GERMANY, THE MAJOR PORTION OF THE WHOLE FORCE, IS COMPLETED AND, BARRING SOME NEW ACTUAL DEVELOPMENT IN EAST GERMANY, THE US DID NOT ANTICIPATE FURTHER MAJOR CHANGES THERE. SOME FURTHER CHANGES IN OUR ESTIMATE MAY EVOLVE FROM THE EXAMINATION OF INDIGENOUS GROUND FORCES AND OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND POLAND THAT IS NOW GOING ON. WE WILL INFORM THE ALLIES OF OUR FINDINGS WHEN THEY ARE AVAILABLE.

6. AS TO THE SPECIFIC DETAILS OF CHANGES IN THE US ESTIMATE, DEAN STATED THAT OF THE ESTIMATED 60,000 ADDITIONAL SOVIETS:

-- ABOUT 35,000 RESULT FROM ENLARGEMENT OF SOVIET DIVISIONS. THIS FIGURE IS EXTRAPOLATED FOR THE ENTIRE NATO GUIDELINES AREA ON THE BASIS OF DATA AVAILABLE ON SOVIET FORCES IN EAST GERMANY. THE 14 TANK DIVISIONS ARE ESTIMATED TO HAVE INCREASED FROM ABOUT 8,500 TO ABOUT 9,500 EACH. THE 13 MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS INCREASED FROM ABOUT 10,500 TO ABOUT 12,000.

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-- ABOUT 7,000 MEN ARE ACCOUNTED FOR IN SOME 10 SEPARATE TANK AND MOTORIZED RIFLE UNITS IN EAST GERMANY WHICH ARE NOW CONSIDERED TO BE SEPARATE UNITS RATHER THAN BELONGING TO DIVISIONS.

-- ABOUT 10,000 ARE IN 9 REGIMENTAL-SIZED TRAINING UNITS IN EAST GERMANY, WHICH ARE NOW BELIEVED TO BE SEPARATE FROM DIVISIONS , AND PROBABLY USED TO TRAIN JUNIOR NCOS AND SPECIALISTS SUCH AS TANK DRIVERS.

-- ABOUT 5,000 ARE IN NEW SA-4 MISSILE BRIGADES RECENTLY INTRODUCED INTO EAST GERMANY.

-- AND ABOUT 4,500 MEN ARE ESTIMATED TO HAVE BEEN ADDED IN EAST GERMANY TO OPERATE AND SUPPORT SOME 3,000 ADDITIONAL LOGISTICAL VEHICLES THAT HAVE BEEN BROUGHT IN SINCE 1969.

HE CONCLUDED BY AGAIN NOTING THAT THIS HAD NOT BEEN A SUDDEN BUILD-UP BUT HAD BEEN SLOWLY TAKING PLACE OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS.

7. BUWALDA COMMENTED THAT THESE FIGURES SEEMED TO MAKE AGREEMENT

WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON A DATA BASE MORE IMPORTANT AND HE ASSUMED THAT THE DATA SUB-GROUP OF THE MBFR WORKING GROUP WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK ON THIS PROBLEM.

8. BUWALDA THEN ASKED WITH REGARD TO RUMSFELD'S ORAL STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR ELEMENTS (PARAS 13 AND 19 REFTEL), WHETHER THE INTENT WAS TO USE THESE ELEMENTS TACTICALLY AS A POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION FOR THE WARSAW PACT BEYOND THE US REDUCTIONS FORESEEN IN THE FIRST-STAGE OF THE PRESENT US MBFR APPROACH OR WHETHER IT WAS INTENDED TO GET MORE SOVIET FORCES FOR THEM. RUMSFELD REREAD PARA 19 OF REFTEL AND ADDED THAT THE US DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE A REALISTIC NEGOTIATING AIM TO ASK FOR EVEN MORE, SUCH AS THE WITHDRAWAL OF BOTH SOVIET TANK ARMIES IN EAST GERMANY; THIS WOULD DENUDE SOVIET FORCES THERE. MOREOVER, THE US WAS ONLY TALKING ABOUT DRAWING FROM WITHIN THE MIXED PACKAGE OPTION, NOT NECESSARILY USING IT ALL AND CERTAINLY NOT USING IT AT THE OUTSET AND, INDEED, NOT UNLESS IT BECOMES DESIRABLE IN THE NEGOTIATION. RUMSFELD COMMENTED THAT

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WITHDRAWAL OF THE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS WOULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE AND THAT IF WE CAN OBTAIN OUR OBJECTIVE OF WITHDRAWING ONE TANK ARMY, THE NATO OVERALL DEFENSES WILL IN ANY CASE BE CONSIDERABLY IMPROVED.

9. FINALLY, BUWALDA NOTED THAT THE US CONTINUED TO RELY ULTIMATELY ON NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION IN ITS APPROACH TO MBFR AND COMMENTED THAT THE OTHER ALLIES WERE STILL LEFT WITH THE PROBLEM OF HAVING TO RELY ON VERIFICATION MEANS WHICH WERE NOT AVAILABLE TO THEM. RUMSFELD RESPONDED THAT IT WAS GENERALLY REALIZED THAT IN DEALING WITH MANPOWER WE ARE DEALING WITH THE COMPONENT OF ARMED FORCES WHICH IS MOST DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE

BY ANY MEANS, INCLUDING THE USE OF OBSERVATION POSTS AND EXPANDED USE OF MILITARY ATTACHES. WE WILL PROBABLY NEVER HAVE REAL CERTAINTY IN THIS FIELD UNLESS, UNEXPECTEDLY, THE NEGOTIATIONS RESULT IN AN UNPRECEDENTED EXCHANGE OF DATA. TO MEET THIS SITUATION, THE US HAD CHOSEN A REDUCTION OPTION WHICH MINIMIZED THE EFFECTS OF DATA UNCERTAINTY. BEYOND THIS, RUMSFELD SAID, HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE US WAS OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO ANY ATTEMPT WHATEVER TO ESTABLISH WHETHER THE FIRM SOVIET

RESISTANCE OF THE PAST TO SO-CALLED INTRUSIVE INSPECTION HAS CHANGED OR WAS LESS ADAMANT WHERE EASTERN EUROPE WAS CONCERNED. WHAT THE US DID OPPOSE WAS MAKING SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF ALLIED PROPOSALS ON THESE SUBJECTS A PREREQUISITE FOR ANY AGREEMENT, BECAUSE THE US BELIEVED WE COULD HAVE REASONABLE ASSURANCE THROUGH NATIONAL MEANS.

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10. AMBASSADOR PECK (UK) NOTED THAT A UK SUBSTANTIVE PAPER ON MBFR WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE COUNCIL IN A FEW DAYS. WITH REGARD TO THE NEW US PAPER, PECK COMMENTED ON A PERSONAL BASIS THAT HE WELCOMED THE COMMON CEILING IDEA CONTAINED IN THE US PAPER BUT THAT HE WAS A LITTLE WORRIED BY THE OMISSION OF THE "COMMON FLOOR", WHICH IDEA HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE APRIL 30 US PAPER ON MBFR. SECOND, HE THOUGHT THAT THE QUESTION OF COMBAT CAPABILITY (PARA 12 D REFTTEL) NEEDED MORE EMPHASIS. THIRD, HE THOUGHT THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN GETTING THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT AN APPROACH OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED IN THE US PAPER. FINALLY, HE SAW A NEED FOR MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION OF MBFR. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN DEVELOPING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE MBFR AGREEMENT IF INDIVIDUAL ALLIED GOVERNMENTS COULD MAKE ASSURANCES ON THE BASIS OF THEIR OWN INFORMATION. RUMSFELD COMMENTED THAT THE SECURITY IMPLICATION FOR THE ALLIANCE WAS THE IMPORTANT THING TO KEEP IN MIND. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE US APPROACH GAVE EMPHASIS TO COMBAT CAPABILITY. RUMSFELD SAID THE US BELIEVED ITS PROPOSAL WAS PLAUSIBLE AND REASONABLE; IT HAD NOT BEEN BUILT UP ARTIFICIALLY, AND IT WAS A REALISTIC WAY OF DEALING WITH EXISTING DISPARITIES. HE DOUBTED THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD ASK FOR LESS. RUMSFELD ADDED THAT THE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS HE HAD MENTIONED COULD, OF COURSE, MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH IN A NEGOTIATION OR IN A PROBING OPERATION.

11. AMBASSADOR ERALP (TURKEY) SAID THAT IT MATTERED TO HIS COUNTRY WHERE THE WITHDRAWN SOVIET TANK ARMY WOULD GO; HE ASKED RUMSFELD TO COMMENT ON THIS. RUMSFELD STATED THAT MILITARILY, IT IS IMPLAUSIBLE THAT THE SOVIET FORCES WITHDRAWN FROM THE CENTRAL FRONT WOULD BE LOCATED IN AREAS OTHER THAN THE AREA OF THE WESTERN SOVIET UNION ADJACENT TO POLAND WHERE THESE FORCES COULD BE USED IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES. NATURALLY, WE WOULD MONITOR THIS ENTIRE MATTER CLOSELY THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE FLANK STATES, WITH THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE TALKS NOW FULLY ASSURED AS A RESULT OF THE VIENNA TALKS,

WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO FOLLOW THIS ALONG WITH US. FINALLY, OF COURSE, MOVEMENT OF WITHDRAWN SOVIET FORCES TO AREAS WHICH INCREASED THE THREAT TO THE FLANKS WOULD, IF IT DID ACTUALLY TAKE PLACE, CREATE A NEW SITUATION WHICH WE WOULD HAVE TO LOOK AT VERY CAREFULLY.

12. FRG CHARGE BOSS ASKED WHETHER IT WAS CORRECT THAT THE TOTAL OF NUCLEAR ELEMENTS AFFECTED DURING BOTH PHASES IN THE US APPROACH  
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WOULD NOT ADD UP TO MORE THAN THAT DESCRIBED IN OUTCOME NUMBER THREE OF THE US APRIL 30 PAPER. WOULD THE US WANT TO PUT IN MORE IN THE SECOND PHASE? RUMSFELD REPLIED THAT THE US BELIEVED THIS WAS NOT THE TIME TO DISCUSS THE COMPOSITION OF THE SECOND PHASE. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE NUCLEAR COMPONENTS THE US DID NOT HAVE MORE IN MIND THAN THOSE DESCRIBED IN THE APRIL 30 US PAPER.

13. BOSS THEN ASKED WHETHER THE FIGURES FOR NATO FORCES PROVIDED IN THE US PAPER (PARA 8 REFTTEL) INCLUDED GERMAN TERRITORIAL FORCES. RUMSFELD SAID GERMAN TERRITORIAL FORCES WERE NOT INCLUDED.

14. ASYG PANSA REFERRED TO THE LANGUAGE REGARDING THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS (PARA 14 REFTTEL) WHERE IT WAS STATED THAT "SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD INCLUDE EUROPEAN FORCES ON THE WESTERN SIDE." HE ASKED WHETHER THE WORD "INCLUDE" WAS CORRECT IN THIS CASE, AND, IF SO, WHAT DID THIS MEAN MORE SPECIFICALLY AS REGARDS THE ROLE OF STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS FORCES. RUMSFELD CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS THE CORRECT WORD AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE US HAD MADE NO DECISIONS ON THIS MATTER, BUT THAT IT ANTICIPATED THAT EUROPEAN FORCES

WOULD BE THE MAJOR COMPONENT OF NATO REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE. THE US WOULD HOPE, TOO, TO GET AS MANY SOVIET FORCES AS FEASIBLE INTO THE SECOND STAGE. BUT ALL THESE MATTERS SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR LATER DECISION BY THE ALLIES.

15. AMBASSADOR CATALANO (ITALY) ASKED FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION ON THE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS THAT THE US HAD IN MIND IN ITS APPROACH TO MBFR, COMMENTING THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE A BEARING ON STRATEGIC QUESTIONS.

RUMSFELD INVITED DEAN TO COMMENT ON THIS QUESTION; DEAN SAID THAT THE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS WOULD BE THOSE WARHEADS, F-4S AND PERSHING LAUNCHERS, DESCRIBED IN THE US APRIL 30 PAPER. THIS WOULD BE THE POOL WHICH COULD BE DRAWN ON, IF NEEDED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE STATED THAT IT SEEMED QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BRING UP THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WITHIN THE MBFR CONTEXT. POSSIBLE ALLIED WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THESE QUESTIONS WOULD BE, OF COURSE, ONLY WITHIN THE LIMITS SET FORTH AND WITHIN THE LIMITED CONTEXT OF THE REDUCTIONS AREA.

16. AMBASSADOR MENZIES (CANADA), REFERRING TO THE PROPOSED US  
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FRAMEWORK (PARA 22 REFTEL) ASKED WHETHER IT WAS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT A SITUATION WHERE THEY COULD NOT SPREAD OUT THEIR TANK ARMY TO COVER GAPS CAUSED BY WITHDRAWALS WHILE THE ALLIES WOULD REMAIN FREE TO MOVE FORCES TO COVER POSSIBLE GAPS IN WESTERN DEFENSES. SECOND, HE ASKED WHETHER INCLUDING NUCLEAR ELEMENTS AS OUTLINED IN THE US APRIL 30 ALTERNATIVE DID NOT RAISE THE WHOLE QUESTION OF INCLUDING FORCES OTHER THAN NATO GROUND FORCES. RUMSFELD REPLIED ON THE FIRST POINT THAT THE US THOUGHT THE FRAMEWORK IT PROPOSED WAS A SUITABLE NEGOTIATING POSITION ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT EVOLVE FROM ITS ORIGINAL FORM. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE EXPECTED THAT OTHER THINGS THAN GROUND FORCES WOULD BE RAISED ANYWAY DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

17. AMBASSADOR MENZIES ALSO INQUIRED WHETHER THE STABILIZING MEASURE PROVIDING FOR LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENTS OF FORCES ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES WITHIN THE AREA (PARA 22 C(2) REFTEL) MEANT THAT NATO FORCES WOULD NOT BE FREE TO MOVE ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE REDUCTION AREA. RUMSFELD REPLIED THAT ANY INHIBITIONS APPLIED TO THE WARSAW PACT IN THIS CASE WOULD ALSO LIKELY APPLY TO THE ALLIES. THE PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSAL RUMSFELD ADDED, WAS TO HELP PREVENT A CONCENTRATION OF FORCES WHICH COULD BE DESTABILIZING.

18. VICE ADMIRAL MINTER, USN, (DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, M.C.) NOTED THAT THE DATA BASE HAD BEEN REFERRED TO BY PREVIOUS SPEAKERS. HE COULD ASSURE THE COUNCIL THAT THE DATA SUBGROUP OF THE MBFR WORKING GROUP WAS WORKING ON THIS PROBLEM, BUT OF COURSE, THE SPEED OF ITS WORK WAS DEPENDENT UPON NATIONAL INPUTS. HE HOPED TO HAVE A DATA BASE AVAILABLE IN SEPTEMBER. ADMIRAL MINTER WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED SACEUR'S ANALYSIS OF THE US PAPER OF APRIL 30 AND HE THOUGHT IT WAS NOTEWORTHY THAT SACEUR HAD FOCUSED ON WARSAW PACT TANKS AS A SOURCE OF CONCERN, A CONCERN THAT WAS ALSO EVIDENT IN THE APPROACH TAKEN IN THE PRESENT US PAPER.

19. THE DISCUSSION CLOSED WITH ASYG PANSA EMPHASIZING FIRST THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO PUB

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